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ADMIRALTY

Admiralty Jurisdiction in Asbestos Litigation:
The Fourth Circuit Draws the Line
Article III, section two of the Constitution grants exclusive jurisdiction
of admiralty and maritime cases to the federal courts.' Traditionally, the
locality of a wrong was the single relevant factor in establishing admiralty
jurisdiction for tort actions. 2 If an alleged wrong occurred on navigable
waters, the plaintiff could bring an admiralty action in federal court. 3 The
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Congress enacted § 1333(l) of Title 28 of the United States
Code pursuant to article III, section two of the U.S. Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1976).
Section 1333(1) provides that district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the
courts of the states, of . .. [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction." Id. See
Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 365-70 (1959) (explaining scope of grant
of admiralty jurisdiction to federal courts). For a discussion of the constitutional grant of
admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts see Putnam, How the FederalCourts Were Given
Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 460 (1925). The purpose of a separate federal admiralty
jurisdiction is to promote uniformity in maritime laws. I BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 105 at 710 (7th ed. 1985). The congressional grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts,
however, does not supercede all state law. See Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354, 373 (1959) (holding that state law must yield to maritime law when necessary to
promote uniform laws governing maritime activity). While states must yield to the federal
courts' admiralty jurisdiction when the needs of a uniform maritime law so require, the state
still has an interest in claims that may outweigh the federal interest of a uniform maritime law.
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra, § 105 at 7-14. See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text
(discussion of weighing state against federal interest when determining admiralty jurisdiction of
claim). For a general discussion of the judicial grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal
courts see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 1-9, at 18-21 (2d ed. 1975);
Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLuM. L. REv. 259 (1950);
Chamlee, An Introduction to Admiralty, 22 MERCER L. REV. 523, 524 (1971).
2. See Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (No. 13,902) (C.C.D. Me. 1813). In Thomas
v. Lane, Justice Story first articulated the locality standard for invoking admiralty jurisdiction
in tort actions. Id. at 960. Thomas held that the claimant could not bring his libel action in
admiralty because he failed to allege that the wrong occurred on navigable water. Id. Similarly,
in De Lovio v. Boit, Justice Story determined that a claim's relation to maritime navigation
and commerce governed admiralty jurisdiction for contract actions while the locality of the
wrong determined admiralty jurisdiction for tort claims. De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444
(No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). For a general discussion of the development and scope of
admiralty jurisdiction see GILMORE & BLACK, supra note I § 1-9-1-19 at 18-52.
3. See The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 27-29 (1865). In The Plymouth, the Supreme
Court gave full credence to the locality test for determining whether admiralty jurisdiction was
proper. Id. at 34. The Court, in addition to citing favorably Thomas v. Lane, held that all
torts occurring on navigable waters were cognizable in admiralty regardless of whether the tort
occurred on board a vessel. Id. at 36; see Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (No. 13,902)
(C.C.D. Me. 1813). For a detailed discussion of the historical development of the locality test
for invoking admiralty jurisdiction see Comment, Torts Along the Water's Edge: Admiralty or
Land Jurisdiction, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 95 (1968). In response to much litigation concerning the
scope of the term "navigable waters," the Supreme Court in The Genessee Chief determined
that navigable waters include inland waters as well as ocean waters. The Genessee Chief, 53
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Supreme Court, until recently, espoused the locality requirement as the sole
factor in determining whether admiralty jurisdiction existed. 4 In Executive
Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,5 however, the Supreme Court
determined that the locality of the tort alone is an insufficient criterion for
determining admiralty jurisdiction. 6 The Executive Jet Court conceded that
the tort at issue met the locality test, but held that the alleged wrong must
bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity before admiralty jurisdiction would lie. 7 While judicial scholars have hailed the Executive
Jet decision as an overdue solution to the problems presented by the locality
test,' courts have experienced difficulty in determining whether the scope of
admiralty jurisdiction is proper under Executive Jet.9 This difficulty stems

U.S. (12 How.) 233, 242 (1851). For a general discussion of the evolution of the term "navigable
waters" see Guinn, An Analysis of Navigable Waters in the United States, 18 BAYLOR L.R. 559
(1966).
4. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205-06 (1971) (plaintiff denied
admiralty jurisdiction in suit for injuries sustained while operating fork lift on dock beside
navigable waters).
5. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
6. Id. at 268. The plaintiff in Executive Jet sought admiralty jurisdiction on the basis of
the locality test when his plane ingested seagulls into its engine during takeoff and crashed into
the navigable waters of Lake Erie. Id. at 250-51. The plaintiff sued the air traffic controller on
duty at the airport from which the plane departed, the city of Cleveland as owner and operator
of the airport, and the airport manager. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed to
keep the runway free of birds or to warn pilots of the birds' presence. Id. at 252. See infra
notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's reasoning in Executive Jet).
7. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 268. The Supreme Court in Executive Jet determined that
in light of the history and purpose of admiralty law, federal courts should grant admiralty
jurisdiction on the basis of a claim's relationship to traditional maritime activity. Id. The
Executive Jet Court held that because the plaintiffs' action implicated no maritime concerns
and only incidentally occurred on navigable waters, the plaintiff could not bring his action in
admiralty. Id. at 273-74. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court's reasoning in Executive Jet).
The Supreme Court in Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson put to rest judicial controversy
surrounding the breadth of the Executive Jet ruling. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457
U.S. 668, 673 (1982), reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 899 (1982). In Foremost, the Court held that the
nexus requirement introduced in Executive Jet applies outside of the aviation tort context. Id.
at 673. The Foremost case involved the collision of two pleasure crafts on a river in Louisiana
causing the death of one passenger. Id. at 669. In a majority opinion the Supreme Court
concluded that the nexus requirement not only applies outside of the context of aviation torts,
but also applies when determining admiralty jurisdiction for noncommercial torts. Id. at 674.
The Court reasoned that a boating accident on navigable waters affects maritime commerce
regardless of whether the accident involves a pleasure or commercial craft. Id. at 675. But see
id. at 683 (Justice Powell, dissenting). In dissenting, Justice Powell argued that Executive Jet
did not support the majority decision. Id. Powell reasoned that the wreckage of a jet airplane,
as in Executive Jet, affects maritime commerce in the same way as the wreckage of two pleasure
boats, yet the Supreme Court denied admiralty jurisdiction for the plaintiffs' claim in Executive
Jet. Id.; see Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 250-51.
8. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, § 1-10 at 30-31, n.98q. (suggesting that Executive
Jet moves toward more rational approach to determining admiralty jurisdiction for tort claims).
9. See Carroll v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 512 F.2d 4, 10 (1st Cir. 1975) (Aldrich,
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from the Supreme Court's failure in Executive Jet to set forth specific criteria
for determining whether a tort is significantly related to traditional maritime
activity. 0 To assist lower courts in determining whether a claimant properly
may bring an action in admiralty, the federal circuits have developed varying
means of implementing the nexus requirement presented in Executive Jet."
In Oman v. Johns-ManvilleCorporation,'2 the Fourth Circuit, adopting a four

factor analysis of the nexus requirement, concluded that claims for asbestos
related injuries do not lie within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal
courts even though the injuries occurred on navigable waters.,'
In Oman, five employees of the Newport News Shipyard

4

brought suit

in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against
Johns-Manville Corporation and nine other asbestos manufacturers and
distributors. 5 The plaintiffs sought damages for injuries sustained from
6
exposure to asbestos fibers while installing asbestos insulation on ships.'
J., concurring) (confusion exists concerning factors courts must consider in determining nexus
relationship).
10. See Comment, Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction:Flounderingon the Sea of Inconsistency,
27 U. FaA. L.R. 805, 811 (1975) (criticizing Executive Jet as lacking guidelines by which courts
should determine if claims satisfy nexus requirement). But cf. Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
764 F.2d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding guidance in Executive Jet's discussion of history and
purpose of admiralty law), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 351 (1985); infra notes 27-53 and accompanying text (discussion of Oman).
11. See Oman, 764 F.2d at 230 (using four factor analysis to determine whether nexus
relationship exists); Harville v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 731 F.2d 775, 783 (lth Cir.
1984) (using four factor analysis to determine whether claim satisfies nexus requirement); Austin
v. Unarco Industries, Inc., 705 F.2d 1, 9-11 (lst Cir. 1983) (using seaworthiness doctrine to
determine whether shipyard workers properly brought products liability action in admiralty),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1247 (1983); Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 844 (2d Cir.
1983) (analyzing maritime nature of product to determine whether products liability action
satisfied nexus requirement), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983); Owens-Ill., Inc. v. United States
Dist. Court for the Western Dist. of Wash., 698 F.2d 956, 970 (9th Cir. 1983) (using four
factor analysis to determine whether admiralty jurisdiction exists and emphasizing traditional
concepts of admiralty law); Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525-26 (5th Cir. 1973) (using four
factor analysis to determine whether nexus requirement existed), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969
(1973); infra notes 32-53 and accompanying text (discussion of Oman); infra notes 110-12 and
acompanying text (discussion of Harville); infra notes 114-25 and accompanying text (discussion
of Owens-Ill.); infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text (discussion of Keene); infra notes 14048 and accompanying text (discussion of Austin).
12. 764 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 351 (1985).
13. Id. at 233. See infra notes 26-53 and accompanying text (discussion of Oman).
14. See White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d' 234, 234 (4th Cir. 1981), (White II),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1103 (1982), vacated, 764 F.2d 224 (1985). The original plaintiffs in
White v. Johns-Manville Corp. were John W. White, James T. Oman, Fred R. Walker, High
V. Reynolds and Willie A. Gibbons. Id. The plaintiffs brought separate actions which the
district court consolidated for trial. Oman, 764 F.2d at 226.
15. White II, 662 F.2d at 234. The named defendants in White II were Johns-Manville
Corporation, Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, Raybestos-Manhatten Corporation, OwensCorning Fiberglass Corporation, Pittsburg Corning Corporation, The Celotex Corporation,
Unarco Industries, Inc., H.K. Porter Company, Southern Asbestos Company and Eagle-Picher
Industries, Inc. Id.
16. Id. at 238. The plaintiffs' work in Oman involved installing asbestos insulation on
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Under Virginia state law, the plaintiffs faced a two year statute of limitations
period which, if applicable, would limit or bar their recovery.1 7 In an apparent
effort to circumvent the state statute of limitations and apply the equitable
doctrine of laches, s the plaintiffs sought to bring their claim in admiralty. 9
The district court denied admiralty jurisdiction, reasoning that the plaintiffs'
work bore no significant relationship to traditional maritime activity and
20
thus failed to satisfy the nexus requirement of Executive Jet.
On appeal to the fourth Circuit, a three judge panel in White v. JohnsManville Corporation(White 11)2" held that the plaintiffs' claim satisfied the
nexus test and therefore was cognizable in admiralty.2" The White II court reasoned that the installation of insulation was necessary for a ship to fulfill its

ships both under construction and being repaired. Id. About 90 to 95 percent of the plaintiffs'
work was done while the ships were docked in navigable waters. Id. at 239.
17. Id. Section 8.01-243 of the Virginia Code states that actions for personal injuries must
be brought within two years of the time the action accrues regardless of the theory of recovery. VA.
CODE §8.01-243 (1980 Replacement ed.).
In Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a cause of
action accrued when the injury occurred. See Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 959, 959,
275 S.E.2d 900, 905 (1981). The Locke court held that the limitations period should commence from the date on which medical evidence could reveal that the plaintiff had been injured.
Id. in Large v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
relying on Locke, found that a plaintiff suffering from respiratory disease due to exposure to silica
and asbestos dust was injured at the time when medical evidence could have revealed the injury.
See Large v. Bucyrus-Eric Co., 524 F. Supp. 285, 288-89 (E.D. Va. 1981), aff'd, 707 F.2d 94 (1983).
Thus, the Largecourt held that the statute of limitations period began to run when the medical evidence
could have revealed the injury regardless of whether physicians actually performed medical tests. Id.
18. See infra note 19 (doctrine of laches is available in admiralty).
19. White II, 662 F.2d at 239. Laches is an affirmative defense available under admiralty
law which bars a claim only when the defendant proves that the plaintiff unnecessarily delayed
in filing suit and that the delay prejudiced the defendant. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S.
265, 282 (1961); see also M. MORRIS, TnE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJUras § 123 at 225
(3rd ed. 1975) (discussion of equitable doctrine of laches in admiralty law). Admiralty actions
excluded from the laches doctrine include salvage suits and petitions for limitations of liability.
43 U.S.C. § 730, 1303(b) (1976). For a discussion of the laches doctrine in asbestos suits see
Comment, Admiralty Jurisdiction:The New Wave in Asbestos Litigation, 13 U. BAIT. L. REV.
145 (1983) [hereinafter cited as The New Wave in Asbestos Litigation].
In 1985 the Virginia legislature enacted § 8.01-249 of the Virginia Code which states that
actions for asbestos related injuries accrue when a physician first communicates the injury to
the claimant. VA. CODE § 8.01-249 (1984 Replacement Vol. & Supp. 1985). Consequently,
claimants no longer must seek admiralty jurisdiction for asbestos related claims to avoid
Virginia's general two year statute of limitations period for products liability actions. See VA.
CODE § 8.01-243. For an overview of the discovery rule which tolls the statute of limitations in
latent disease cases until a physician or patient actually discovers the illness, see The New Wave
in Asbestos Litigation, supra, at 154-56.
20. White II, 662 F.2d at 238.
21. 622 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981) (White I1), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982), vacated,
764 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1985).
22. Id. at 241. The White II court read Executive Jet as requiring that a claim satisfy
both a nexus test and locality test before the claim could lie in admiralty. Id. at 239; Executive
Jet, 409 U.S. at 268. The plaintiffs' tort in White 1I met the locality test. White II, 662 F.2d
at 241. Between 90-97 percent of the plaintiffs' exposure to asbestos fibers occurred while the
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maritime function and that therefore the plaintiffs' work was essential to the
maritime industry. 23 The panel then cited several cases as support for its
conclusion that claimants properly may bring products liability actions in
admiralty when their claims meet the Executive Jet criteria. 24 The White 11
court vacated the district court order and remanded the case with instructions
to try the claim under admiralty law and to determine whether the doctrine
of laches barred the suit."
The Fourth Circuit, sua sponta, called for an en banc hearing of the
case to reconsider the panel's ruling in White 11.26 The Fourth Circuit in
Oman overruled White H and concluded that the plaintiffs' work bore no
reasonable relationship to traditional maritime activity. 27 The Fourth Circuit,
accordingly, held that the plaintiffs' claim for work related injuries could
not lie in admiralty. 28 The Oman court determined that the panel's decision
in White II was the result of a misapplication of case law and a misunder29
standing of the nexus requirement introduced in Executive Jet.
The Oman court initially distinguished the various cases that the White
II court cited to support the invocation of admiralty jurisdiction for products
liability claims.3 0 The Fourth Circuit observed that these cases involved

plaintiffs were working on ships which were docked in navigable waters. Id. See infra notes 2324 and accompanying text (discussing White II court's reasoning on the nexus relationship).
23. White II, 662 F.2d at 239.
24. Id. at 239-40. The White II court relied on several cases which held that products
liability claims were cognizable in admiralty when the products caused damage or injuries which
implicated maritime concerns. Id. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 618 F.2d
319, 321-22 (5th Cir. 1980) (admiralty jurisdiction allowed in action against manufacturer of
gyropilot steering unit for damages incurred when ship collided with another ship and ran
aground due to alleged defects in steering unit); Jones v. Bender Welding and Mach. Works,
Inc., 581 F.2d 1331, 1336-37 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding admiralty jurisdiction in action against
manufacturer of marine engine for damages to fishing vessel resulting from allegedly defective
design of engine's oil cooler supply lines); Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. and
Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1140 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding admiralty jurisdiction in action against
manufacturer of marine engine for damages resulting from allegedly defective fuel filter that
caused fire aboard ship at sea); JIG The Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters
Corp., 579 F.2d 171, 174 (5th Cir. 1975) (admiralty jurisdiction allowed in action against ship
builder for loss of shrimp boat due to builder's alleged negligent design of boat), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 954 (1976).
25. White I, 662 F.2d at 241. Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp. is a rehearing of White v.
Johns-Manville Corp. Id. at 236. The Oman Court renamed the case because John W. White,
an original plaintiff in the White II case, did not join in the motion for rehearing.
26. Oman, 764 F.2d at 226.
27. Id. See infra notes 32-53 and accompanying text (discussing rationale behind Oman
ruling).
28. Oman, 764 F.2d at 232.
29. Id. at 228. See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text (discussing Oman court's
criticism of White II rationale).
30. Oman, 764 F.2d at 229. See supra note 24 (cases on which White II court relied to
support its conclusion that products liability actions are cognizable in admiralty).
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products that caused damages to ships. 3 The Oman court reasoned that
damages to ships have a significant effect on the traditional admiralty
concerns of maritime navigation and commerce.12 The Fourth Circuit maintained, however, that the Oman case involved asbestos fibers which caused
injuries to land based workers and thus implicated no traditional maritime
3
concerns.1
The Oman court then determined that the White II court had utilized a
flawed analysis in concluding that the plaintiffs satisfied the nexus requirement of Executive Jet. 34 The Fourth Circuit criticized White II for focusing
exclusively on the occupation of the plaintiffs to determine whether the
plaintiffs' claim met the nexus requirement.3 5 The Oman court maintained
that the holding in White II was incorrect because the panel had failed to
consider all the factors necessary for a proper analysis of Executive Jet's
nexus requirement. 6 The Fourth Circuit in Oman ruled that when determining whether a plaintiff's claim satisfies the nexus requirement, courts should
consider four factors-the functions and roles of the parties, the types of
vehicles and instrumentalities involved, the causation and type of injury, and
37
the traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law.

31. Oman, 764 F.2d at 229. The Oman court emphasized that each case cited in White H
to support the use of admiralty law in products liability cases involved damage to ships or the
shipping industry. Id. See supra note 24 (cases on which White H court relied to support its
conclusion that products liabilities actions are cognizable in admiralty). The Oman court held
that the plaintiffs' claim implicated no such admiralty concerns. Oman, 764 F.2d at 229. The
Oman court noted, however, that claimants could bring a claim in admiralty for damages
caused by defective asbestos insulation if the damages implicated maritime concerns. Id. The
Oman court indicated that the court would allow a products liability claim involving asbestos
in admiralty if the asbestos caused a fire to spread through a ship. Id. For a general discussion
of admiralty jurisdiction over products liability claims see Note, Determination of Admiralty
Jurisdictionfor Products LiabilityActions, 22 B.C.L. REv. 1133 (1981).
32. Oman, 764 F.2d at 229.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 230.
35. Id. at 228-29. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (White 11 focuses
exclusively on analysis of plaintiffs' function to determine whether admiralty jurisdiction exists);
White I1, 662 F.2d at 239-40.
36. Oman, 764 F.2d at 229. See infra notes 37-49 and accompanying text (general
discussion of four factor analysis in Oman).
37. Oman, 764 F.2d at 230. The four factor analysis adopted in Oman originated in Kelly
v. Smith. See Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969
(1973). In Kelly the plaintiffs sued the caretaker of a private hunting island. Id. at 552. The
defendant caretaker caught the plaintiffs poaching and shot them as they escaped the island by
boat. Id. at 521-22. The Kelly court held that courts must look to the facts and circumstances
of each case to determine whether a claim meets the nexus test of Executive Jet. Id. at 525;
Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 261. The Kelly court examined the functions and roles of the parties,
the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved, the causation and type of injury, and the
traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law. Kelly, 485 F.2d at 525. The Fifth Circuit in
Kelly held that the plaintiffs claim was cognizable in admiralty for the reasons that the party
most seriously injured was the pilot of a boat who was responsible for the navigation of the
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The Oman court began its four factor analysis by examining the functions

and roles of the parties involved in the action." The Fourth Circuit conceded
that the role of the defendant in supplying insulation to the plaintiffs favored
the court's exercising admiralty jurisdiction because the defendants specifi-

cally designed, marketed, and advertised the asbestos insulation for maritime

use. 39 The Oman court ultimately maintained, however, that of the four

factors under consideration, the role of the defendants was the only factor
that favored admiralty jurisdiction.4 The Oman court then determined that
while the plaintiffs' work was important to maritime commerce, it was not
maritime activity. 4' The court reasoned that only work traditionally done by
sailors was related significantly to maritime activity. 42 Because installing
insulation is the work of landsmen and not sailors, the Oman court found
that the role of the plaintiffs militated against invoking admiralty jurisdic43
tion.
The Oman court next considered the causation and type of injury
involved in the plaintiffs' claim. 44 The court reasoned that injuries resulting
from exposure to asbestos fibers were more closely related to negligence in
the construction industry than to negligence involving traditional maritime
activities. 45 Observing that asbestos related injuries are not peculiar to
maritime service, the Oman court determined that the type and causation of
the plaintiffs' injuries counseled against trying the claim in admiralty.46 The
court then examined the instrumentalities involved in the tort.47 The Oman
court maintained that the relationship between ships and the plaintiffs' work
was merely incidental since the plaintiffs would have a similar claim had
they incurred those same injuries while installing asbestos insulation in

vessel on the river; that the vehicle involved was a boat, whose function was transportation on
the river; and that traditional concepts of admiralty law include laws governing the safe
navigation of waterways. Id. at 526. For a general discussion of the impact of Kelly v. Smith
on admiralty tort jurisdiction see Recent Developments, Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction-Tort
Claims Not Within Admiralty Jurisdiction Unless Requisite Maritime Nexus Exists, 27 VAND.
L. REv. 343, 351-52 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments].
38. Oman, 764 F.2d at 230.
39. Id.
40. Id. See infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text (discussion of last three factors in
Oman analysis).
41. Oman, 764 F.2d at 230.
42. Id. at 230-31. The Oman court determined that work is not traditionally maritime if
the only maritime attribute of the activity is that workers perform the activity on board a ship.
Id.
43. Id. at 230. The Oman court noted that sailors occasionally may make repairs to ships
similar to those made by the plaintiffs. Id. The Oman court emphasized, however, that sailors
make repairs only in emergency situations and that landsmen normally make repairs involving
asbestos insulation. Id.
44. Id. at 231.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The Oman court concluded that ships, asbestos insulation, and the tools necessary
for installing the insulation were the vehicles and instrumentalities involved in the action. Id.
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buildings.4 The Fourth Circuit determined that while designed for maritime
use, asbestos has no peculiar maritime character and that exposure to asbestos
49
fibers is unrelated to maritime activity.
The Oman court viewed the fourth factor, traditional concepts of the
role of admiralty, as the most important consideration in analyzing the nexus
requirement. 0 Quoting Executive Jet, the Fourth Circuit determined that
admiralty law evolved to manage specific problems related to maritime
navigation, the seaworthiness of ships, maritime liens, general average,
limitations of liabilities, and claims for salvage. 5' The Oman court concluded
that the plaintiffs' claim involved none of the maritime interests listed in
Executive Jet and therefore implicated no maritime concerns.5 2 On the basis
of its four factor analysis, the Oman court held that the plaintiffs' claim did
not satisfy the nexus requirement and that the plaintiffs therefore could not
3
invoke the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.In determining that installing insulation on ships is not significantly
related to traditional maritime activity, the Oman court's holding furthers
the purpose of the Executive Jet nexus requirement by limiting admiralty
jurisdiction to claims that fall within the scope of activity traditionally
governed by maritime law.5 4 Before Executive Jet, a tort action that occurred
on navigable waters was cognizable in admiralty even though the tort was
unrelated to maritime navigation and commerce. 55 In Executive Jet, however,
the Supreme Court limited the scope of admiralty jurisdiction to tort claims
that are significantly related to maritime activity.5 6 The plaintiff in Executive

48. Id.
49. Id. The Oman court determined that asbestos insulation has no uniquely maritime
character even though manufacturers designed, manufactured, and advertised the insulation for
maritime use. Id.
50. Id. at 231.
51. Id. at 227-28; Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 270. See generally GiLMoRE & BLACK, supra
note 1 § 7-7-7-13, at 500-15 (discussion of maritime navigation); § 3-27, at 150-55 (discussion
of seaworthiness of ships); § 9-1-9-95, at 586-817 (discussion of maritime liens); § 5-1-5-16,
at 244-71 (discussion of general average); § 10-1-10-48, at 818-957 (discussion of limitations
of liabilities); § 8-1-8-15, at 532-88 (discussion of claims for salvage).
52. Oman, 764 F.2d at 231. The plaintiffs in Oman failed to allege that their work was
the type traditionally done by sailors. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (claims arising
from work traditionally done by sailors are cognizable in admiralty).
53. Oman, 764 F.2d at 232. The Oman court noted that courts cannot use admiralty
jurisdiction for the sole purpose of bypassing state law. Id. The Oman court refused to interfere
with the application of Virginia's" statute of limitations. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Oman
intimates that to allow the plaintiffs' claim in admiralty simply to bypass state law would
undermine the independence of the state's government. Id.
54. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (maintaining that Supreme Court sought
to limit admiralty jurisdiction with nexus requirement of Executive Jet); Executive Jet, 409 U.S.
at 268. See also infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (Oman limits admiralty jurisdiction
by using nexus requirement); Oman, 764 F.2d at 232.
55. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (discussion of locality of tort as only
factor iirdetermining whether admiralty jurisdiction exists).
56. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 250. For a general discussion of the Supreme Court's
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Jet sought admiralty jurisdiction on the basis of the locality test when his

plane ingested seagulls into its engine during takeoff and crashed into the
navigable waters of Lake Erie.5 7 The Supreme Court in Executive Jet
determined that allowing a claim in admiralty based on the claim's relationship to traditional maritime activity, as opposed to the locality of the

occurrence, was more sensible and consonant with the history and purpose
of admiralty law.5" Thus, the Supreme Court developed the nexus test to

exclude from federal admiralty courts those tort claims in which the wrong
only incidentally occurred on navigable waters. 9 The plaintiffs' claim in
Oman is typical of the type of claims that the Supreme Court sought to
exclude from admiralty jurisdiction via the nexus requirement of Executive
Jet.6" Injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos fibers are not uniquely
maritime. 61 In Oman, the maritime location of the plaintiffs' injuries presents

reasoning in Executive Jet see H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SuPREME COURT

§§

25-1 to

25-3 at 671 (3d ed. 1979).
57. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 250.
58. Id. at 273. In Executive Jet, the plaintiff's plane crashed into Lake Erie about a fifth
of a mile from shore. Id. at 250. The Supreme Court reasoned that allowing a claim to lie in
admiralty simply because the tort occurred a few hundred yards from land made little sense.
Id. at 266.
59. Id. at 261. In Executive Jet, the Supreme Court sought to remedy the inconsistencies
of the strict locality test for determining admiralty jurisdiction by requiring a nexus relationship
between the alleged wrong and maritime activity. Id. at 255. For instance, the Supreme Court
in T. Smith & Son Inc. v. Taylor found admiralty jurisdiction lacking in a case brought by a
longshoreman who was injured when a loading sling knocked him off a dock and into navigable
waters. See T. Smith & Son Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1928). In Minnie v. Port
Huron Terminal Co., however, the court upheld admiralty jurisdiction when a ship's hoist
knocked a longshoreman off the deck of a ship in navigable waters and onto a dock. See
Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647, 649 (1937).
In some cases, the absurdity of applying the strict locality test caused courts to abandon
the test for certain claims. See Peytavin v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121, 1127 (5th
Cir. 1972) (denying admiralty jurisdiction in action for injuries resulting from collision of two
automobiles on ferry crossing navigable waters); Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385
F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 1967) (refusing to grant admiralty jurisdiction in action for injuries
incurred from diving off shore and into shallow, but navigable waters); McGuire v. City of
New York, 192 F. Supp. 866, 871-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (refusing to grant admiralty jurisdiction
in action for injuries plaintiff incurred while swimming in navigable waters). For criticism of
the locality test see 7 A. J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, ADMIRALTY 1 325[3]-[5] (2d ed. 1972);
Note, The Other Half of Executive Jet: The New Rationality in Admiralty Jurisdiction,57 TEX.
L. REv. 977, 986-89 (1979) [hereinafter cited as The Other Half of Executive Jet]; Black, supra
note 1, at 264. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (maintaining that because tort in
Oman only incidentally occurred on navigable waters, nexus requirement of Executive Jet
properly excludes tort claim from admiralty jurisdiction).
60. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (Executive Jet's nexus test properly excludes
from admiralty jurisdiction claims that only incidentally occur on navigable water); Executive
Jet, 409 U.S. at 257-58. See also infra note 62-63 and accompanying text (plaintiffs' injuries in
Oman only incidentally occurred on navigable waters); Oman, 764 F.2d at 231.
61. See Oman, 764 F.2d at 231 (asbestos related injuries are unrelated to maritime
activity); Harville v. Johns-Manville Corp., 731 F.2d 775, 785 (lth Cir. 1984) (asbestosis is
nonmaritime disease); Owens-Ill. Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the Western Dist. of
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no additional admiralty concerns.6 2 Indeed, the only distinction between the
plaintiffs' injuries in Oman and those afflicting workers with asbestos related
diseases in the construction industry is the location of the worker's exposure
to asbestos fibers. 63 Therefore, because the plaintiffs' injuries only incidentally occurred on navigable waters, the Oman court properly employed the
nexus test to exclude the claim from the court's admiralty jurisdiction.64
The analysis of the Fourth Circuit panel in White II, on the other hand,
undermines the purpose of the nexus requirement.6 5 The panel in White II
determined that the plaintiffs' claim met the nexus requirement because the
plaintiffs' work was necessary to fulfill the ship's maritime function, and
because the insulation installed by the plaintiffs became an integral part of
the ship. 66 Under White II, claims arising from any work necessary for a
ship to fulfill its maritime function are related to traditional maritime
activity. 67 Many products manufactured on land eventually become appurtenances of ships and are necessary to fulfill a ship's maritime function. The
White II rationale implies that claims arising from the manufacturing of
maritime products on land satisfy the nexus requirement of Executive Jet.68
Wash., 698 F.2d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 1983) (asbestos-related diseases and asbestos bear little
maritime connection).
62. Oman, 764 F.2d at 231. Under certain fact patterns, claims for asbestos related
injuries are cognizable in admiralty. For instance, if a sailor incurred injuries through exposure
to asbestos fibers while making emergency repairs on a ship, he could bring a claim for his
injuries in admiralty. See supra text accompanying note 42 (claims arising from work traditionally done by sailors are cognizable at admiralty); see also infra notes 142-43 and accompanying
text (concerns of admiralty law include protection of sailors).
63. See Oman, 764 F.2d at 231. The Oman court determined that the plaintiffs' injuries
were identical to those afflicting thousands of land based workers. Id.; (quoting Harville v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 731 F.2d 775, 785 (11th Cir. 1984)). In Keene Corp. v. United States,
however, the Second Circuit recognized a distinction between asbestos related claims brought
by shipyard workers and similar claims brought by land based workers. See Keene Corp. v.
United States, 700 F.2d 836, 844 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983). The Keene
court noted that admiralty jurisdiction may lie in a products liability action involving asbestos
if the manufacturer designed, advertised, and marketed the asbestos product for maritime use.
Id. See infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text (discussion of Keene rationale). But cf. supra
notes 58-59 and accompanying text (single factor analysis of product or instrumentality causing
injury is inconsistent with policy of Executive Jet); Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 261.
64. Oman, 764 F.2d at 231-32. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (Supreme Court
advocates use of nexus requirement to exclude from admiralty jurisdiction claims for wrongs
fortuitously occurring on navigable waters).
65. See White II, 662 F.2d at 239 (White II panel applied single factor analysis to invoke
admiralty jurisdiction); infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (White II undermines Executive
Jet by allowing locality of tort to determine whether admiralty jurisdiction exists); Executive Jet,
409 U.S. at 261.
66. White II, 662 F.2d at 239.
67. See id. (holding that plaintiffs' claim satisfied nexus test because plaintiffs' work was
necessary for ship to sail); infra note 68 and accompanying text (any work necessary for ship
to sail is related significantly to maritime activity under rationale of White II).
68. See White II, 662 F.2d at 239. The White II court ruled that the plaintiffs' claim
satisfied the nexus test because the work from which the claim arose was necessary for the ship
to fulfill its maritime role. Id. Extending this reasoning, any work, on land or sea, necessary
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White H distinguished these claims from the plaintiffs' claim on the basis
69
that the plaintiffs' claim involved a tort which occurred on navigable waters.
Thus, under White II, the determining factor for invoking admiralty jurisdiction is the locality of the tort. 70 The White 11 holding, therefore, defeats
the purpose of Executive Jet by allowing the locality of the tort to determine
71
admiralty jurisdiction.
The Fourth Circuit in Oman recognized that admiralty law is not suited
72
to governing claims that only incidentally are related to maritime activity.
The Oman court, while agreeing with White II that the plaintiffs' claim was
related to maritime navigation and commerce, ruled that more than a mere
relationship to maritime activity was necessary to satisfy the nexus requirement. 73 Quoting Executive Jet's extensive discussion of the history and
purpose of admiralty law, the Oman court concluded that a claim satisfies
the nexus requirement only when the claim arises out of an activity traditionally governed by admiralty law. 74 The Oman court's interpretation of the
75
nexus test properly limits the scope of admiralty law.
The Oman court cited Executive Jet's discussion of the history and
purpose of admiralty law as a guideline for determining claims that satisfy
the nexus test. 76 The Fourth Circuit, however, did not examine the traditional
concepts of admiralty law alone to determine whether the plaintiffs' claim
met the nexus requirement.7 7 Instead, the Oman court adopted a formula

for a ship to sail is related to maritime activity, and claims arising from such work satisfy the
nexus test. See id. Thus, White II defeats the policy of Executive Jet by broadening admiralty
jurisdiction to include claims that do not implicate maritime concerns. See Executive Jet, 409
U.S. at 273 (purpose of nexus test is to exclude actions not related significantly to maritime
activity).
69. See White II, 662 F.2d at 239. The White IH court held that a claim must satisfy both
the nexus test and the locality test before the plaintiff could bring his action in admiralty. Id.
Thus, the distinguishing factor between the plaintiffs' claim in White II and other claims arising
out of work necessary for a ship to sail is the locality of the tort giving rise to the claim. Id.
70. White II, 662 F.2d at 239. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (under White
II holding, locality of tort determines admiralty jurisdiction).
71. White II, 662 F.2d at 239. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (Supreme Court
introduced nexus requirement in Executive Jet to eliminate use of strict locality test in
determining admiralty jurisdiction).
72. See Oman, 764 F.2d at 231-32 (claimants should not bring actions in admiralty that
do not require expertise of admiralty court).
73. Id. at 230. The Oman court acknowledged that the plaintiffs' work was important to
maritime commerce, but held that mere importance to maritime commerce does not bring an
activity within the scope of admiralty law. Id. See GILMORE & BtAcK, supra note 1, § 170 at
29 (maintaining that while concerns of shipping industry may reach back to ranch on which
cattle were bred, admiralty jurisdiction should not).
74. Id. at 227-28 (citing Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 269-70).
75. See Oman, 764 F.2d at 231 (using nexus test to eliminate from admiralty jurisdiction
claims which are not related significantly to maritime activity); supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (admiralty jurisdiction is limited to actions traditionally governed by maritime
law).
76. Oman, 764 F.2d at 228.
77. See id. at 230. The Oman court adopted a four factor analysis to determine whether
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that three other federal circuits use. 78 Under the Oman analysis, the traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law is just one of four factors that
79

the court considers in determining whether to allow a claim in admiralty.

The Oman court's four factor analysis, however, attenuates the Supreme

Court's emphasis on the traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law,
the final factor of the Oman court's four factor analysis. 0
Each of the first three of the four factors in the Oman court's analysis-

the functions and roles of the parties, the causation and type of injury, and
the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved-either support or oppose

the characterization of a claim as an activity traditionally governed by
admiralty law.' Thus, when considering whether a claim falls within admiralty jurisdiction, courts qualitatively may assess these first three factors in
determining whether a claim is an activity governed by the traditional
concepts of the role of admiralty law, the fourth and final factor. 2 Consequently, courts should give higher significance to the final factor, which is
established upon reference to the first three factors. 3 This drawback to the
Oman four factor analysis may be academic since most claims that are
cognizable in admiralty under the first three factors will also be cognizable
in admiralty under the last factor u Furthermore, an examination of the
Oman court's individual treatment of each factor supports the conclusion

that the four factor analysis effectively accomplishes the purpose of Executive
Jet's nexus requirement." The Fourth Circuit in Oman did not examine each
factor mechanically in an isolated setting, but rather viewed the factors
6
collectively to determine whether the claim was of a maritime nature.

an action properly was in admiralty. Id. The traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law
is one of the four factors in the Oman analysis. Id. at 231.
78. Oman, 764 F.2d at 230. See Woessner v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 767 F.2d 634,
641 (5th Cir. 1985) (using four factor analysis to determine whether admiralty jurisdiction
exists); Harville v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 731 F.2d 775, 783 (11th Cir. 1985) (same);
Owens-Ill. Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the Western Dist. of Wash., 698 F.2d 967, 970
(9th Cir. 1983) (same).
79. Oman, 764 F.2d at 231.
80. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (citing Executive Jet's discussion of history
and purpose of admiralty law as primary guidelines for determining whether admiralty jurisdiction lies for tort claims); Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 253-63; infra notes 81-82 and accompanying
text (maintaining that courts should give higher significance to final factor of Oman four factor
analysis).
81. See Woessner v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 757 F.2d 634, 643 (5th Cir. 1985) (using
four factor analysis to determine whether claim falls within traditional concepts of role of
admiralty law); infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text (discussion of Woessner).
82. Woessner, 757 F.2d at 643.
83. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (history and purpose of admiralty law are
proper guidelines for determining whether claims satisfy nexus test).
83. See Woessner, 757 F.2d at 643 (extending special significance to traditional concepts
of role of admiralty law in borderline situations).
84. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (courts should examine first three factors
of Oman analysis to determine whether claims are within the traditional concepts of role of
admiralty law).
85. Oman, 764 F.2d at 229.
86. Id.
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In addition to properly utilizing the nexus test, Oman furthers the
purpose behind the test. 7 The Supreme Court in Executive Jet described
admiralty jurisdiction as a question of federalism. 8 The Executive Jet Court
introduced the nexus requirement to prevent federal courts from usurping
state law by expanding admiralty jurisdiction beyond its proper bounds. 9
The federal interest in admiralty law is a uniformity of law governing
maritime activityP ° Weighing the interest in uniform laws to govern admiralty
against the interest of the state in self-government, the Supreme Court in
Executive Jet concluded that in order to achieve a proper balance between
state and federal interests, state courts should have jurisdiction over claims
that only incidentally are related to maritime concerns. 9' The Oman court
similarly concluded that the federal interest in uniform laws governing
admiralty claims militated against allowing the plaintiffs to bring their case
under admiralty law.9 2 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that since each federal
circuit that had considered the issue had rejected admiralty jurisdiction for
asbestos related claims by shipyard workers, the White II decision deviated
93
from the uniform conclusion reached in other circuits.

87. See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text (Oman furthers federal interest in
uniformity of maritime law); Oman, 764 F.2d at 232.
88. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 272-73. See Note, The Other Half of Executive Jet, supra
note 59, at 982 (whether to apply federal admiralty law or state law is essentially question of
federalism).
89. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 272-73.
90. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, § 1-17 at 48 (state law cannot interfere with
uniform operation of maritime law).
91. See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 272-73. The Supreme Court in Executive Jet found
that the claim before the court was connected only incidentally with navigable waters. Id. at
273. See supra notes 56-58 and -accompanying text (discussion of Executive Jet facts). The Court
determined, after noting the rightful independence of state governments, that the plaintiff could
have his claim heard under state tort law without implicating maritime concerns. Id.
92. Oman, 764 F.2d at 232. The Oman court found that the plaintiff's claim was similar
to many claims brought under state tort law. Id. The court determined that the federal interest
in uniform maritime laws governing was not great enough to supplant state tort law with federal
admiralty law. Id.
93. Id. See Woessner v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 757 F.2d 634, 649 (5th Cir. 1985)
(denying admiralty jurisdiction for asbestos related claims brought by shipyard workers); Harville
v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 731 F.2d 775, 787 (11th Cir. 1984) (same); Austin v. Unarco
Indus., Inc., 705 F.2d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1247 (1983); Keene
Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 844-45 (2d Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864
(1983); Owens-Ill. Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the Western Dist. of Wash., 698 F.2d
956, 972 (9th Cir. 1983) (same). See infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text (discussion of
Woessner); infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text (discussion of Keene); infra notes 114-24
and accompanying text (discussion of Owens-Ill.).
The Oman court reasoned that because all federal circuits that have considered whether
asbestos related claims brought by shipyard workers are cognizable in admiralty have denied
federal jurisdiction to the parties bringing the claims, the Oman decision furthered the federal
interest in uniform laws governing admiralty by overruling White II. Oman, 764 F.2d at 232.
On the facts of Oman, however, two circuits may have granted jurisdiction in admiralty to the
plaintiffs. See infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text (discussion of Keene analysis); infra
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The Oman holding supports Executive Jet's purpose not only by consid-

ering the federal interests involved, but also by recognizing the state's interest

in governing the claim. 94 In Executive Jet, the Supreme Court advised that

federal courts proceed with caution when determining jurisdiction over claims
that raise issues involving the independence of state governments. 95 The

Oman court refused to apply admiralty jurisdiction to bypass Virginia's
statute of limitations that would bar an arguably meritorious claim. 96 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit in Oman noted that Virginia state courts were
hearing asbestos related claims involving the construction industry. 97 Because

claims brought by construction workers for asbestos induced injuries differ
from the plaintiffs' claim in Oman only in the location of the alleged
exposure to asbestos, 9 the Oman court held that Virginia's interest in uniform

laws governing asbestos related claims outweighed any federal admiralty
concern in the action. 99 Following the Supreme Court's advice, the Fourth
Circuit in Oman denied admiralty jurisdiction after a cautious four factor
analysis of the claim. Five other federal circuits have considered whether shipyard workers can
sue asbestos manufacturers under admiralty jurisdiction. 0 The Fifth, Ninth,
notes 114-24 and accompanying text (discussion of Owens-Ill. analysis). The Second Circuit in
Keene Corp. V. United States denied the plaintiffs' admiralty jurisdiction because the plaintiffs
failed to allege that the asbestos product causing the injury was designed and advertised for
maritime use. Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 844 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 846 (1983). In contrast, the Oman plaintiffs alleged that the product causing their injuries
was designed and advertised for maritime use. Oman, 764 F.2d at 230. Therefore, if faced with
the facts of Oman, the Second Circuit, following Keene, may permit similar plaintiffs to bring
asbestos actions in admiralty. See infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text (discussion of
Keene).
The outcome of Owens-lt. Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the Western Dist. of
Wash. also may have been different had the Ninth Circuit faced the Oman facts. The Owens111. court determined that the plaintiffs' claim was not cognizable at admiralty because the
plaintiffs incurred injuries while constructing ships as opposed to repairing ships. Owens-Ill.,
698 F.2d at 972. The Oman plaintiffs incurred injuries while both constructing and repairing
ships. Oman, 764 F.2d at 230. Thus, on the Oman facts, the Owens-Ill. court may have granted
admiralty jurisdiction for the plaintiffs' claim. See infra notes 114-24 and accompanying text
(discussion of Owens-Ill.).
94. Oman, 764 F.2d at 232. The Oman court noted that the plaintiffs' claim was the type
traditionally committed to resolution under state law. Id.
95. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 272-73 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)).
96. Oman, 764 F.2d at 232. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (plaintiffs'
claim in White II barred under state law statute of limitations but allowed under federal law
laches doctrine); White 11, 662 F.2d at 239-41.
97. Oman, 764 F.2d at 232.
98. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (maintaining that plaintiffs' claim in
Oman differed from claims brought by land based construction workers only in location of
exposure to asbestos fibers); Oman, 764 F.2d at 232.
99. Oman, 764 F.2d at 232.
100. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text (Oman adopted Fifth Circuit's four
factor analysis to determine if nexus relationship existed); Oman, 764 F.2d at 229.
101. See supra note 93 (circuits that have considered whether shipyard workers can bring
asbestos related claims in admiralty have denied admiralty jurisdiction).
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and Eleventh Circuits apply the four factor analysis used in Oman to
determine whether claims for asbestos related injuries meet the nexus requirement of Executive Jet.'0 2 Among these circuits, the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits apply the four factor test in a manner that is similar to Oman's
0 3
In Woessner v.
application, but is more consistent with Executive Jet.'
04
Johns-Manville Sales Corporation,1 for example, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the
final factor of traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law was dispositive
in borderline cases.'0 5 The Woessner court determined that the plaintiffs'
asbestos related claim, similar to the plaintiffs' claim in Oman, was a
borderline case because some factors supported admiralty jurisdiction and
other factors opposed trying the claim under maritime law.' °6 The Woessner
court therefore chose to weigh the federal interests in providing uniform
maritime laws against the interest of state governments in handling actions
that claimants traditionally bring under state law. 0 7 The Woessner court
concluded that the traditional concerns of admiralty law did not implicate
an interest in a uniform resolution of claims brought by shipyard workers
who only coincidentally were injured on ships.'0 8 The Fifth Circuit reasoned
that the plaintiffs should bring their claims under the same law that governs
actions brought by workers with similar injuries incurred on land. 1°9

102. See Woessner v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 757 F.2d 634, 642-43 (5th Cir. 1985)
(applying four factor analysis to determine whether admiralty jurisdiction lies); Harville v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp., 731 F.2d 775, 783 (11th Cir. 1984) (same); Owens-Ill., Inc. v.
United States Dist. Court for the Western Dist. of Wash., 598 F.2d 967, 970 (9th Cir. 1983)
(same).
103. See infra notes 104-109 and accompanying text (Woessner court emphasizes guidelines
presented in Executive Jet for determining whether admiralty jurisdiction exists). The Supreme
Court in Executive Jet emphasized the importance of the history and purpose of admiralty law
in determining whether admiralty jurisdiction exists. See supra note 76 and accompanying text
(history and purpose of admiralty law are only guidelines presented in Executive Jet by which
courts must determine whether claim is cognizable at admiralty); Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at
253-67. The Woessner court recognized the history and purpose of admiralty law as dispositive
in borderline cases. Woessner, 757 F.2d at 643. In contrast, the Oman court, while acknowledging the importance of the traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law, failed to hold
that this factor controls in borderline cases. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text
(maintaining that traditional concepts of role of admiralty law is more important than other
factors in Oman's four factor analysis).
104. Woessner, 757 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1985).
105. Id. at 643. In Woessner, land based shipyard workers sought admiralty jurisdiction
for claims against asbestos manufacturers based on injuries sustained from exposure to asbestos
fibers. Id. at 637.
106. Id. at 643. While the Woessner court found that claims for injuries involving ships
normally could fall within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, the court noted that
the functions and roles of the parties, the type and causation of the injuries, and the offending
asbestos insulation were not uniquely maritime and thus opposed trying the plaintiffs' claim in
admiralty. Id. at 643-48.
107. Id. at 643.
108. Id. at 648. The Woessner court determined that the traditional concerns of admiralty
do not include an interest in the uniform resolution of claims by land based workers exposed
to asbestos fibers while working on ships. Id.
109. Id. at 649. The Woessner court reasoned that the plaintiffs should not have access to
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Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Harville v. Johns-Manville Products

Corporation" noted that the issues in claims brought by shipyard workers
for injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos fibers involve questions of
tort law that state courts normally resolve."' Placing special emphasis on
the extent to which the plaintiffs' claim implicated the traditional purposes

of admiralty jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit in Harville ruled that state
courts could hear the plaintiffs' suit and apply state tort law to resolve the

controversy without implicating maritime concerns." 2 By emphasizing the
concepts of the role of admiralty law, both the Fifth Circuit in Woessner
and the Eleventh Circuit in Harville applied an analysis of the nexus
requirement that is consistent with the policies espoused in Executive Jet."'
Unlike other federal circuits, the Ninth Circuit in Owens-Illinois Inc. v.
United States District Courtfor the Western District of Washington'I4 relied

on decisions resolving contract disputes in applying the four factor analysis
used in Oman to determine whether claims by shipyard workers for asbestos
related injuries are cognizable in admiralty. '5 The plaintiffs in Owens-Illinois
brought suit against asbestos manufacturers for injuries incurred from ex6
posure to asbestos fibers while working at shipyards during World War II.11
The plaintiffs were engaged exclusively in the construction of ships.' '7 Relying
on cases which address the issue whether a contract dispute lies within
admiralty jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit in Owens-Illinois noted that courts
consider a contract for the repair of a ship as maritime while a contract for
the construction of a ship is not." 8 The Owens-Illinois court held that
special laws unavailable to similarly situated claimants whose injuries occurred on land. Id. The
court held that although the plaintiffs' injuries occurred on navigable waters, the maritime
location of the tort was insufficient to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Id.
110. 731 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1984).
111. Id. at 786.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (maintaining that courts should give
greater deference to final factor of Executive Jet's four factor analysis).
114. 698 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1983).
115. Id. at 971. While the Owens-Ill. court mentioned the four factors of the Oman
analysis, the Ninth Circuit based its decision on cases resolving contract disputes. Id.; Oman,
764 F.2d at 230.
116. Owens-Ill., 698 F.2d at 969.
117. Id. at 970. Courts may distinguish the Owens-Ill. decision from the Oman decision
because the plaintiffs' work in Owens-Ill. did not include the repair of ships while the plaintiffs'
work in Oman did. See supra note 93 (under Oman facts, Ninth Circuit might grant admiralty
jurisdiction for plaintiffs' claim); Oman, 764 F.2d at 226-27.
118. Owens-Ill., 698 F.2d at 970-71. The Owens-Ill. court cited North Pac. Steamship Co.
v. Hall Bro. Marine Ry. & Shipping Co. to support its conclusion that tort claims arising out
of the repair of ships are cognizable in admiralty while tort claims arising out of the construction
of ships are nonmaritime. Id. North Pac. Steamship Co. v. Hall Bro. Marine Ry. & Shipping Co.
249 U.S. 119, 125 (1919). The Supreme Court in Hall Bro. held that contract claims for the
repair of ships are cognizable in admiralty regardless of whether the vessel is on navigable
water, in dry dock, or hauled up on land. Hall Bro., 249 U.S. at 125. The Owens-Ill. court,
however, required that the plaintiffs' tort occur on navigable waters as well as satisfy the nexus
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because the plaintiffs suffered injuries only while constructing ships, their
claims for damages did not satisfy Executive Jet's nexus requirement." 9
While the Owens-Illinois court briefly examined the functions and roles of
the parties, the vehicles and instrumentalities involved in the action, and the
type and causation of the injuries, the court based its decision on an analysis
of the type of contract involved which fell within the court's consideration
of the traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law. 20 Prior to Executive
Jet, the Owens-Illinois court would have been misguided in relying on
contract cases to conclude that the plaintiffs' claim was not cognizable in
admiralty because the only relevant consideration would have been the
locality of the occurrence.' 2 ' However, with the advent of Executive Jet,
which requires that the alleged tort satisfy the nexus test as well as the
locality test, courts properly may consider cases in determining whether the
tort claim has a maritime nexus.22 In Owens-Illinois, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that since courts traditionally have not viewed contracts for the
construction of ships as being maritime in nature, the plaintiffs' tort claim
arising out of injuries incurred while constructing a ship was not maritime
in nature and did not satisfy the nexus test. 2 3 Thus, the Ninth Circuit in
Owens-Illinois properly relied on contract cases in ruling that the plaintiffs'
24
claim was not cognizable in admiralty.
In Keene Corporation v. United States'25 the Second Circuit chose not
to apply the four factor analysis in determining whether the plaintiffs' claim
was cognizable in admiralty.' 26 The plaintiffs in Keene, relying on White II,
argued that because the asbestos insulation became a part of the ship, installing the insulation was related significantly to maritime activity, and that claims
arising from this work satisfied the nexus requirement.' 2 7 The Keene court
found that the plaintiffs' reasoning undermined Executive Jet by making the
locality of the tort decisive in determining whether to grant admiralty

test before the plaintiff properly could bring his action in admiralty. Owens-Ill., 698 F.2d at
969. But cf. infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text (courts should not require that torts
meet the locality test before allowing claim in admiralty); GLMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, §
1-10 at 30 (Supreme Court's distinction between contract for repair and contract for construction
of ship is erroneous).
119. Owens-Ill., 698 F.2d at 971.
120. Id. at 970-71.
121. See The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 27-29 (1865) (locality of occurrence is only
factor in determining whether admiralty jurisdiction exists for tort claims).
122. See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 268 (Supreme Court requires that tort claims satisfy
nexus test before courts allow claims in admiralty); The Plymouth, 70 U.S. at 27-29 (contract
actions are cognizable in admiralty if claim is related to traditional maritime activity).
123. Owens-Ill., 698 F.2d at 971.
124. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (Supreme Court in Executive Jet espouses
nexus relationship as proper test for invoking admiralty jurisdiction).
125. 700 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
126. Id. at 844.
127. Id.
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jurisdiction. 28 The Keene court denied admiralty jurisdiction on the grounds
that the plaintiffs failed to show that the manufacturer of the asbestos
insulation, which caused the plaintiffs' injuries, designed or advertised the

insulation for maritime use. 2 9 The Second Circuit specifically rejected the
argument that an action for injuries resulting from non-maritime products
may lie in admiralty. '1 The Keene court, like the panel in White II, focused
on a single factor to determine whether the claim was related significantly

to traditional maritime activity.' 3' The Second Circuit's mechanical analysis
is at odds with the policy of Executive Jet.3 2 Nonmaritime products often
cause injuries or damage that implicate traditional maritime concerns.' 33
Thus, in an effort to limit admiralty jurisdiction to claims related to
traditional maritime activity, the Second Circuit has developed a nexus
analysis that excludes actions traditionally within the scope of admiralty

law.'

34

128. Id. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (under White 11 analysis locality of
tort determines admiralty jurisdiction); White 11, 662 F.2d at 239-40.
129. Keene, 700 F.2d at 844.
130. Id.
131. See id. Although the court in Keene purportedly relied on the four factor analysis
introduced in Kelly v. Smith to determine whether the requisite nexus existed, the Keene court
chose to analyze only two of the four factors presented in the Kelly analysis. Id. See Kelly, 485
F.2d 520, 524-26 (5th Cir. 1973) (introducing four factor analysis for determining nexus
requirement); supra note 37 (discussion of Kelly). The Keene court determined that because the
asbestos insulation causing the plaintiffs' injuries had no maritime quality, the instrumentalities
did not favor admiralty jurisdiction for the claim. Keene, 700 F.2d at 844. The Keene court
found that the role of the government, a party in the action, was unrelated to maritime activity.
Id. The Keene court apparently analyzed both the roles of the parties and the instrumentalities and
vehicles involved in the claim. Id. The Keene court's two factor analysis, however, is misleading.
If the plaintiff in Keene had alleged that manufacturers designed and advertised the asbestos
insulation for maritime use, then not only would that allegation change the nature of the
instrumentality involved in the claim, but the allegation also would change the nature of one
of the parties. The government's role then would be a provider of maritime asbestos and would
therefore implicate maritime concerns. See Oman, 764 F.2d at 230 (reasoning that role of defendants in supplying maritime asbestos favored trying claim in admiralty).
132. Keene, 700 F.2d at 843-44; see Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 261 (adopting nexus test
because nexus test is more consistent with purpose of admiralty law than mechanical application
of locality test); see also Comment, In Search of A New Test for Admiralty Jurisdiction:The
Aftermath of Executive Jet, 7 V~AD. J.T.L. 459, 467 (1974).
133. See Austin v. Unarco Indus. Inc., 705 F.2d 1, 9 (lst Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463
U.S. 1267 (1983). In Austin v. Unarco Indus. Inc., the First Circuit refused to accept the Keene
rule that a products liability claim is cognizable in admiralty only when the product or
instrumentality is of a maritime nature. Id. The Austin court reasoned that nonmaritime
products or instrumentalities often cause damage or injury that implicate maritime concerns.
Id. The Austin court cited Sperry Rand Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am. as an example of a case
involving a nonmaritime instrumentality that caused damage which implicated maritime concerns. Id. (citing Sperry Rand, 618 F.2d 319, 321-22 (5th Cir. 1980)). In Sperry Rand, a
nonmaritime component of a steering unit caused a ship to run aground and collide with
another ship. See Sperry Rand, 618 F.2d at 319-20.
134. See Austin, 705 F.2d at 10 (reliance on maritime nature of product to invoke admiralty
jurisdiction undermines federal interest of uniform laws governing maritime activity).
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Under the Oman court's four factor analysis, plaintiffs may bring
products liability claims in admiralty regardless of whether the manufacturer
designed the product for maritime use.' 35 Following the four factor analysis
of Oman, if a court concludes that the instrumentalities involved in the
action are unrelated to traditional maritime activity, the court still may allow
the action to proceed in admiralty if the roles of the parties and the type
13 6

and cause of the injury suggest that maritime law should govern the claim.
The advantage of using the four factor analysis for determining whether
claims meet the nexus requirement is that the four factor analysis compells
courts to consider several factors in granting admiralty jurisdiction as
opposed to relying on a single factor. 3 7 By analyzing and weighing each of
the four factors in its analysis, the Oman court avoided the mechanical
jurisdictional test exemplified by Keene and White IPJ" and criticized by
39
Executive Jet.1

One other federal circuit has considered whether shipyard workers can
sue asbestos manufacturers under admiralty jurisdiction. In Austin v. Unarco
Industries Inc., 40 the First Circuit, using an analysis consistent with the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Executive Jet, determined that survivors of
shipyard workers could not bring actions in admiralty for asbestos related
injuries incurred by their decedents.1'4 The Austin court reasoned that the
case and safety of seamen is implicit in the traditional concerns of admiralty
law discussed in Executive Jet.'42 The First Circuit determined that the

135. See Oman, 764 F.2d at 229-30. In Oman, the Fourth Circuit stated that claimants
could bring products liability actions in admiralty involving nonmaritime products or instrumentalities. Id.
136. See id. at 229. The Oman court noted that the plaintiffs' claim in Sperry Rand
implicated traditional maritime concerns. Id.; Sperry Rand, 518 F.2d at 319-20. Even though
the instrumentality causing the damage in Sperry Rand was unrelated to maritime activity, the
Sperry Rand court properly allowed the claim in admiralty because the damage that the
instrumentality caused implicated maritime concerns. See Sperry Rand, 518 F.2d at 319-20
(damage incurred when faulty steering unit caused ship to collide with another ship and run
aground); supra note 86 and accompanying text (Oman court analyzed four factors collectively
in finding jurisdiction); Oman, 764 F.2d at 232.
137. See Woessner, 757 F.2d at 641-43. The Woessner court not only criticized Keene
and White 11 for allowing a single factor to determine jurisdiction, but also praised the
Kelly four factor analysis as consistent with the thrust of Executive Jet. Id. at 641, 643.
138. See Oman, 764 F.2d at 230-31 (Oman court analyzed four factors collectively to determine whether nexus requirement was met); supra note 137 (Woessner court criticized White 11
and Keene single factor analysis as mechanical and inconsistent with policy of Executive Jet);
Woessner, 757 F.2d at 641-43.
139. See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 261 (criticizing mechanical application of locality test
for determining jurisdiction).
140. 705 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1247 (1983).
141. Austin, 705 F.2d at 18. See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text. (Austin analysis
is consistent with policy of Executive Jet); Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 253-78.
142. Austin, 705 F.2d at 11. In determining whether admiralty law protected the plaintiffs,
the Austin court first determined admiralty law protects sailors or persons doing the work of
sailors via the seaworthiness doctrine. Id. The doctrine of seaworthiness contemplates that a
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concerns of maritime law extend to the safety of anyone engaged in work
traditionally done by seamen. 43 The Austin court determined that the only
real issue in the case was whether the decedents' work was the type traditionally done by sailors. 144 The First Circuit held that since the ships on
which the decedents were working were under construction and thus incapable
of fulfilling their maritime functions, and since the decedents' work involved
specialized tools and skills beyond the scope of a seaman's duty, admiralty
4
law did not govern the hazards of working with asbestos insulation.
The single drawback in the Austin court's analysis is its continued
adherence to the requirement that a claim must satisfy the locality test before
allowing the action to proceed in admiralty.'" While basing its analysis on
the traditional admiralty concern of protecting seamen, the First Circuit
failed to recognize that because the protection accorded sailors applies
regardless of whether a sailor is on land or on navigable water, the locality
test does not apply. 47 With the exception of this drawback, the First Circuit
has provided an objective, consistent means of applying the nexus requirement to products liability claims for personal injury while adhering to the
4
policies underlying the nexus test outlined in Executive Jet. 1

vessel is fit for its intended service. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
The seaworthiness doctrine provides a remedy for sailors injured as a result of a defective
condition on a ship. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 90 (1946).
143. Austin, 705 F.2d at 12. The Austin court reasoned that if courts did not extend the
doctrine of seaworthiness to protect persons serving the same function as sailors, then vessel
owners would subcontract the duties of sailors to nonsailors in order to avoid the cost of
protecting the workers. Id. See Seas Shipping co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 96 (1946) (extending
seaworthiness doctrine to harbor workers who are injured while doing work of sailors). For an
extended discussion of the doctrine of seaworthiness see GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, § 327 at 150-155; George, Ship's Liability to Longshoremen Based on Unseaworthiness: Sieracki
Through Usner, 32 LA. L. REv. 19, 23-25 (1971).
144. Austin, 705 F.2d at 11.
145. Id. at 14.
146. Id. at 8-9. The Austin court referred to the locality of the tort as a "prong" of the
Executive Jet test. Id. at 9; Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 268. Because the ships on which the
plaintiff in Austin was injured were situated on a navigable river when the injury occurred, the
Austin court concluded that the claim met the locality prong of the Executive Jet test. Austin,
705 F.2d at 9.
147. See id. at 11. While the Austin court applied both the locality and nexus tests in
determining whether to exercise admiralty jurisdiction, the court also acknowledged that the
doctrine of seaworthiness protects sailors while on land as well as while at sea. Id. See also
Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 214-15 (1963) (extending protection afforded
by seaworthiness doctrine to seamen while on land).
148. See Austin, 705 F.2d at 11. Courts applying the Austin analysis must consider the
single issue whether the work from which the plaintiffs' claim arose is that traditionally done
by seamen. Id. The Austin analysis works well for actions by injured land based workers, but
does not apply to all tort claims because many of these claims involve damage to ships as
opposed to injuries to persons. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 618 F.2d 319,
320-21-(5th Cir. 1980) (tort action involving damage to ship at sea); JIG the Third Corp. v.
Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 579 F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1975) (tort action for
damage for loss of ship at sea), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 954 (1976).
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The federal circuits that have heard the issue of admiralty jurisdiction
over torts have read Executive Jet as demanding both a locality and a nexus
test for determining admiralty jurisdiction. 49 Justice Stewart's criticism of
the locality test in Executive Jet, however, intimates that the locality of the
tort should not be dispositive in determining whether admiralty jurisdiction

exists.5 0 Apparently, the federal courts reason that narrowing the scope of
admiralty jurisdiction is the only purpose behind the nexus requirement.,'

The language of Executive Jet suggests, however, that the Court not only
sought to exclude claims not properly within admiralty jurisdiction, but also
sought to include actions that claimants properly may bring under admiralty
law but which courts excluded by strictly applying the locality test.'5 2 Under
149. See Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1985) (requiring that
tort must occur on navigable water for admiralty jurisdiction to lie), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
351; Woessner v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 757 F.2d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); Harville
v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 731 F.2d 775, 778 (1lth Cir. 1984) (same); Austin v. Unarco
Indus. Inc., 705 F.2d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1983) (same), cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1247 (1983); Keene
Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 843 (2d Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864;
Owens-Ill., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the Western Dist. of Wash., 698 F.2d 967,
968-69 (9th Cir. 1983) (same).
150. See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 251 (determining that nexus test is more sensible for
determining admiralty jurisdiction than locality test because nexus test requires torts to have
relationship to maritime activity); see also Recent Developments, supra note 37, at 353 (criticisms
of locality test).
151. See infra note 154 and accompanying text (locality plus nexus test allows no more
claims in admiralty than strict locality test).
152. See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 259. In Executive Jet, Justice Stewart criticized the
locality test by citing numerous judicially and congressionally created exceptions to the test. Id.
These exceptions are characterized by torts that are related significantly to maritime activity but
lack the requirement of a maritime locality. Id. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co., 318 U.S. 36, 41-42 (1943) (granting admiralty jurisdiction for claim brought by sailor
injured while on shore performing his duty); Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S.
206, 214-15 (1963) (granting admiralty jurisdiction for claim brought by sailor injured on land
by ship defects); 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1948) (Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act extending
admiralty jurisdiction to claims for damage or injury caused by ships regardless of whether
damage or injury occurred on land or at sea); see also supra note 59 (courts make exceptions
to locality requirement under certain circumstances). For a general discussion of legislative
extensions of admiralty jurisdiction see Comment, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Executive Jet in
Historical Perspective, 34 OHIO ST. L.R. 355 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Executive Jet in
HistoricalPerspective]. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's criticism of the locality test as
both underinclusive and overinclusive see The Other Half of Executive Jet, supra note 59 at
981-84.
The Supreme Court in Executive Jet criticized a strict application of a locality test as
"mechanical" and inconsistent with the purposes of maritime law. Executive Jet, 409 US. at
261. the Fourth Circuit, however, has continued to apply the locality test in a mechanical
fashion to determine whether a claim is cognizable at admiralty. See Hessinger v. Tideland
Electric Membership Corp., No. 85-1673 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 1986). In Hessinger v. Tideland
Electric Membership Corp., the Fourth Circuit dedicated six paragraphs to the issue of whether
a Hobie Cat sailboat was in the water or on land when its mast struck a power line and killed
three recreational sailors. Id., slip op. at 5-8. Although the defendants in Hessingerargued that
navigable water began at the water's edge, the Fourth Circuit concluded that navigable water
included shoreline up to the "mean high water mark," or the point of the sea's farthest advance
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the federal circuits' interpretation of Executive Jet, a tort must occur on
navigable waters as well as satisfy the nexus test before the federal courts
will hear the claim under their admiralty jurisdiction.'5 3 Therefore, the effect
of the federal circuits' interpretation of Executive Jet is that courts hear no
more claims in admiralty than they would otherwise hear absent the nexus
requirement.5 4 If courts are to resolve the problems of both underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness, the locality test should not be dispositive in
determining whether admiralty jurisdiction exists.'
In determining whether a claim is significantly related to traditional
maritime activities, courts would serve the policy of Executive Jet better by
simply viewing the location of the tort as a factor for consideration rather
than a requirement. 5 6 Once a court concludes that a claim is related
significantly to traditional maritime activity, the court should weigh the
federal interest in maintaining a uniform body of law governing the activity

during high tide. Id., slip op. at 9-10. The Hessingercourt concluded that, because the decedent
had not pulled their boat beyond the mean high water mark when the boat's mast struck the
power line, the accident occurred on navigable waters. Id., slip op. at 10-11. Apparently, if the
sailors had pulled their sailboat a few feet farther up the shoreline, beyond the mean high water
mark, and then stuck the power line, their action would not be cognizable at admiralty. See id.
The Supreme Court in Executive Jet, however, intimated that allowing a claim in admiralty
based on whether an accident occurred a few feet on one side of a line constituting navigable
water "makes little sense." Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 266. After concluding that the accident
occurred on navigable water, the Hessinger court determined that the claim was significantly
related to maritime activity and therefore satisfied the nexus requirement of Executive Jet.
Hessinger, No. 85-1673, slip op. at 12-14. The Fourth Circuit's inquiry into the location of the
accident in Hessinger is unnecessary because the federal courts should allow any claim
significantly related to maritime activity in admiralty regardless of the location of the tort that
gave rise to the claim. See supra text accompanying notes 150-55 (locality of tort should not be
determinative in granting admiralty jurisdiction for claim arising from tort).
153. See supra note 149 (claims must satisfy locality and nexus tests for admiralty
jurisdiction in all circuits that have tried issue presented in Oman).
154. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (federal circuits require that tort satisfy
locality test before tort claim is cognizable in admiralty). In requiring that claims satisfy both
the nexus test and the locality test to lie in admiralty, the federal circuits simply are combining
a reasonable test and an unreasonable test. See supra note 59 (Supreme Court in Executive Jet
held nexus test more sensible than locality test because nexus test requires that tort claims have
significant relationship to maritime activity before courts can try claims under maritime law);
Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 261. Combining the nexus test with the locality test does not solve
the underinclusiveness problem inherent in the locality test. See supra note 152 (Supreme Court
in Executive Jet criticizes underinclusiveness of locality test); Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 253-60.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 152-55 (concluding that eliminating locality test
entirely will solve problem of both overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness).
156. See Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 527 (5th Cir. 1973) (Morgan, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1973). The dissent in Kelly intimates that the location of the tort may
eventually become simply a factor for consideration in determining whether a claim is cognizable
in admiralty. Id. at 527 n.1; see also supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (courts must
eliminate locality test as requirement for admiralty jurisdiction to solve problem of underinclusiveness). For a discussion of a proposal to make the locality of the tort a factor to consider in
determining jurisdiction see Executive Jet in HistoricalPerspective, supra note 137, at 369.
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against competing interests of the state in adjudicating the claim.'5 7 If the
state interest outweighs the federal interest, the federal court should exercise
restraint.' S Following the analysis outlined above, courts properly should
conclude that claims brought by land based workers against land based
manufacturers for injuries implicating no maritime concerns are not related
significantly to traditional maritime activity.' 9 Furthermore, because the
injuries in question in Oman differ from those afflicting land based workers
only in location of occurrence, the interest of the state in maintaining a
consistent standard by which to judge these claims outweighs any federal
interest in uniformity of maritime law. 6°
The Oman decision holds that shipyard workers must bring their claims
for asbestos induced injuries under state law despite the possibility that the
state statute of limitations may bar such claims.' 6' While this result seems
harsh, Oman simply places shipyard workers in the same situation as other
62
plaintiffs who incurred asbestos induced injuries on land.
The Oman four part analysis for determining the requisite nexus in
potential admiralty claims is less certain than the White II single factor
analysis because the former requires courts to examine four factors collectively while the latter requires courts to examine a single factor. 63 The
Supreme Court in Executive Jet, however, sought to eliminate the single
factor, mechanical analysis by espousing the nexus requirement.'6 The Oman
analysis, however, is not entirely subjective. The Fourth Circuit's four factor
analysis provides specific areas of emphasis for attorneys arguing that a
plaintiff properly may bring an action in admiralty. 65 In light of the Oman

157. See Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d at 527 (Morgan, J., dissenting). The dissent in Kelly
criticized the majority decision for depriving the state of its control over the action. Kelly, 485
F.2d at 527 n.l. The dissent argued that even if an analysis of the Kelly factors favored
admiralty jurisdiction, the state's interest in trying the claim outweighed any federal interest in
the action. Id. See also supra note 37 (discussion of Kelly facts).
158. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (Kelly dissent argues that courts should
not allow claim in admiralty if state's interest in controlling claim outweighs federal interest in
uniform laws governing maritime activity).
159. Oman, 764 F.2d at 230-32.
160. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (courts should consider state interest
in granting admiralty jurisdiction); supra note 92 and accompanying text (Oman furthers federal
interest in uniform admiralty law by bringing Fourth Circuit in line with other circuits).
161. Oman, 764 F.2d at 230-32.
162. See id. (finding plaintiffs' claim in Oman identical to asbestos suits brought under
state law). For a general discussion of the effect of Virginia's statute of limitations on asbestos
litigation see The New Wave in Asbestos Litigation, supra note 19 at 152-54.
163. See Oman, 764 F.2d at 230 (applying four factor analysis to determine whether nexus
requirement of Executive Jet was met); Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 268; White II, 662 F.2d at
234 (applying single factor analysis to determine whether claim met nexus requirement of Executive
Jet); Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 268.
164. See supra note 59 (Supreme Court in Executive Jet criticized mechanical application
of locality test).
165. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (Oman adopted analysis for determining
requisite nexus that includes four separate factors); Oman, 764 F.2d at 230.

